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Website authentication technologies attempt to make the
identity of a website clear to the user, by supplying in-
formation about the identity of the website. In prac-
tice however, usability issues can prevent users from cor-
rectly identifying the websites they are interacting with.
To help identify usability issues we present RUST, a
Retargetable USability Testbed for website authentica-
tion technologies. RUST is a testbed that consists of
a test harness, which provides the ability to easily con-
figure the environment for running usability study ses-
sions, and a usability study design that evaluates usability
based on spoofability, learnability, and acceptability. We
present data collected by RUST and discuss preliminary
results for two authentication technologies, Microsoft
CardSpace and Verisign Secure Letterhead. Based on the
data collected, we conclude that the testbed is useful for
gathering data on a variety of technologies.
1 Introduction
The heightened interest in website authentication tech-
nologies is fueled by a rise in cybercrimes, such as phish-
ing, and US federal regulations that require financial
websites to use two-factor authentication [2, 7]. Website
authentication technologies attempt to solve one direc-
tion of the mutual authentication problem on the Internet
by either altering the login process or providing the user
with supplemental information. The primary usability
questions in website authentication are how does a web-
site communicate to the user it is the real site and how
does a user identify a malicious website? Usability plays
a major factor in the effectiveness of the technology but
receives little attention during development.
To facilitate usability evaluations, we present RUST, a
Retargetable USability Testbed which is a testbed com-
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posed of a usability study design and a test harness for
the test environment. First we discuss prior work in the
area and then we describe the design process for the us-
ability study. Next, we describe the test harness. Finally,
we present results from two usability studies conducted
at Columbia to illustrate how we validated RUST.
2 Background
Prior to website authentication tools gaining popularity,
Whalen and Inkpen conducted a study to evaluate web
browser security indicators [15]. They collected data
on which indicators users considered when evaluating a
webpage’s security by asking participants to perform a
set of tasks while focusing on the each website’s secu-
rity. Most participants checked for either the lock icon
or https in the URL bar, but few checked for or under-
stood certificates. Similarly, in an effort to understand
why phishing attacks are successful, Dhamija et al. mea-
sured how users evaluate possible phishing websites [6].
Participants were presented with a series of websites and
asked to determine if the site was real or fake. 23% of
the participants based their decision solely on indicators
they found in the webpage content. Some participants
looked for the lock icon but mistook lock images in the
webpage content for trusted security indicators.
Web Wallet is an anti-phishing tool that alters how
password are entered [16] by providing an interface for
entering sensitive information, other than the web form
provided by the website. It helps the user by removing
the guesswork of which websites have been visited in
the past. A usability study showed Web Wallet was ef-
fective at helping the participants identify the real web-
site but participants were easily tricked by spoofs of the
interface. Wu et al. also evaluated the usability of tool-
bars to assess if they assisted users in identifying phish-
ing websites [17]. The results of the usability study in-
dicate the toolbars are ineffective in assisting users on
well-designed spoofs. Another study evaluating website
authentication was Jackson et al.’s evaluation of whether
browser indicators of extended validation certificates as-
sisted users in identifying phishing attacks [11]. The re-
sults showed new indicators like a green URL bar for an
EV certificate did not offer an advantage over the exist-
ing indicators.
Schechter et al. [13] conducted an in-lab study to eval-
uate a website authentication technology where each user
has a personalized image. Participants were asked to per-
form a series of online banking tasks while security indi-
cators were gradually removed. Their results show par-
ticipants fail to recognize the absence of security indica-
tors, like the SSL lock and HTTPS, and will enter their
password in the absence of their personalized image.
Usability study design is a well-studied area [10],
however, designing security usability studies creates ad-
ditional challenges. One issue is how to design a study
where the test administrators attack the participants [3].
More recently, usability studies have been designed to
evaluate methods of conducting security usability stud-
ies. For example, Schechter et al. conducted a between-
subject usability study to measure the effect of asking a
participant to play a role and use fake credentials rather
than their personal information [13]. They found partic-
ipants who used their real data act more securely dur-
ing the tasks. To help usability study designers, SOUPS
made kits available from the papers in their proceed-
ings [14]. The kits provide usability study material but
are fairly specific and reusing the material would require
a number of changes.
2.1 User Study Design
In RUST, usability is measured by the technology’s
spoofability, learnability, and acceptability. Spoofabil-
ity is an attacker’s ability to trick the participant into en-
tering personal information on an illegitimate website.
Learnability is the user’s ability to correctly use the tech-
nology with and without instruction. Acceptability is the
user’s reaction to the technology; if users do not under-
stand why a security process is necessary they will find
ways to break the process [1].
We chose an in-lab study as the method of evaluation
so we could attack our participants and measure spoofa-
bility without raising ethical concerns [12]. Because we
wanted to see how participants would behave under con-
ditions of attack, we did not disclose the purpose of the
study beforehand, since doing so would place an unreal-
istic focus on security. We supplied participants with cre-
dentials to eliminate privacy concerns and because users
do not already have the necessary credentials to use with
the novel technologies we were testing. We asked par-
ticipants to play a role during the session to justify the
use of fake credentials and motivate the participant to act
securely.
To evaluate both spoofability and usability, we asked
participants to complete tasks at real and spoofed bank-
ing websites. Spoofability is measured by the number
of successful attacks in a session. To evaluate learnabil-
ity, four tasks are given before the participant is pro-
vided with instructions in the fifth task. This provides
the chance to gather data on the technology’s ease of use
prior to the participant reading documentation. The ac-
ceptability of the technology is based purely on a par-
ticipant’s subjective opinion and cannot be measured
through direct observation. Instead, we collected feed-
back through questions, using Likert scales to classify
their reactions, and open-ended questions to comment on
their thoughts during the session.
We designed the study as a within-subject study, where
each participant is given the same set of tasks under
the same conditions. We collected session data by the
test harness and through self-reported feedback. Before
beginning the study, we gave each participant a demo-
graphic survey with questions to gauge their experience
with web browsing. We gave them copies of the study
instructions, the role they are asked to play, and personal
information to accompany the role. The instructions state
the goal of the study is to improve online banking. We
asked participants to imagine that they have an uncle
who is in the hospital for an unexpected extended pe-
riod of time and needs someone to assist in managing his
finances. In addition, we asked the participant to act nor-
mally and to treat their uncle’s information as they would
their own.
During a session, we sent the participant eight emails,
each of which contains a task and a link to the website
where they should complete the task. Four of the emails
are phishing attacks and direct the participant to an il-
legitimate site. The other four emails direct the partic-
ipant to a real financial institution’s website. Some of
them are requests from Uncle John for a specific action
to be taken, and one is an email from the bank introduc-
ing the new technology and providing basic instructions.
The first task directs the participant to the real site, and
allows them to experience the technology working prop-
erly before an attempted spoofing attack. Between each
of the tasks, we asked the participants to comment on
their experience if they completed the task, or why they
decided not to complete the task for any reason. After
the tasks are completed we asked participants to express
their opinion of the technology in a post-study question-
naire.
2.2 Test Harness Implementation
The test harness component of the RUST testbed cre-
ates a transparent testing environment that can be easily
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configured for different technologies, thus allowing for
a simplified process for conducting usability evaluations.
The use of proxies and logging tools allow for data to be
collected on the participant’s actions while providing the
environment for serving the necessary study webpages.
RUST collects data by monitoring the URLs requested
while keeping track of the order that pages are accessed,
which indicates whether a phishing attack was success-
ful. Additionally, the test harness monitors the time spent
on a webpage. Time monitoring is important for a tech-
nology with multiple steps or pages because the time
spent on a page may indicate possible problems in the
login sequence. To monitor the order the webpages are
visited and the time spent on each page, a JavaScript bea-
con is inserted on each test webpage the participant may
visit. The test harness also includes scripts to convert the
logging output into a more manageable format. A Python
based script is used to send MIME based emails during
the test session. Also, a simple shell script is included in
the testbed to send specific emails to participants at fixed
time intervals during the session. The complete details
of the design are contained in [4].
3 Evaluating RUST
We used RUST to conduct usability study sessions with
Windows CardSpace and Verisign Secure Letterhead.
Each of the technologies approach the website authen-
tication problem differently. CardSpace changes the lo-
gin procedure, while Secure Letterhead provides the user
with additional information to help them determine the
website’s identity.
For recruitment we solicited participants on Craigslist,
placed a listing in the Facebook Marketplace and posted
fliers at Columbia University. The only requirement that
we places on participants is that they had experience with
web browsing.
3.1 Windows CardSpace
CardSpace is an identity metasystem that manages a
user’s online identities [5], replacing usernames and
passwords. When a user needs to log in to a website, the
user clicks on a button in the page content that begins the
login process. At this point, CardSpace is launched and
the website’s credentials are sent. When the CardSpace
interface appears, the user selects the appropriate ”card”
that represents their credentials. The user does not sub-
mit any personal information to the website. Instead,
the exchange of credentials is handled completely within
the CardSpace protocol once the ”card” representing the
user’s identity is chosen by the user. Since the proto-
col is designed to reveal information only to the verified
parties, tricking the user into giving away their creden-
tials is less feasible and different attacks are required. As
a result, we designed spoofs that focus on the user en-
terinig sensitive information directly to the website. One
email stated CardSpace was down for scheduled mainte-
nance and directed the user to a spoofed page to signup
for temporary access. The user was then sent to a web-
page requesting sensitive information. The other spoof
redirected the user to a form when they attempted to lo-
gin with CardSpace, stating the participant must regis-
ter for an identity card by entering personal information.
Since the user logged into the same institution’s website
with a identity card previously, this should be alarming.
3.1.1 Data Collected
We recruited a total of 13 participants to evaluate
CardSpace, 4 female and 9 male. Their ages ranged from
18-60 and each of them spend 20 or more hours per week
on the Internet.
Of the eight tasks given in a session, the four tasks
prior to the CardSpace instructional email directed the
participant to: a real website with CardSpace, a spoofed
site that asked the participant to register for a new iden-
tity card, a real website with CardSpace, and a spoofed
website that stated CardSpace was down for mainte-
nance. The four remaining tasks were in the same or-
der and the first of the second set of four was also the
instructional email.
In the first task, on the real website, 12 of the 13 par-
ticipants reported some level of confusion. However, 6
participants stated in the post-study questionnaire that
CardSpace was intuitive, despite commenting they were
confused after the first task. Their comments after the
first task include: ”It took me a little while to know where
I was suppose to click”, ”I wasn’t asked to enter account
info which was suspicious”, ”I understood the task, but
the first thing I should have been asked is my account id
and password”, ”when I clicked on the log-in tab I was
a little confused, I am accustomed to seeing a user ID
box and then some type of password, but what popped
up were cards, there seems to be some serious security
lapse”, and ”when I clicked login something irrelevant
came up but when I hit ok I was logged in”.
In the first spoof, when participants were told to reg-
ister for a new card, 11 participants completed the task
without noticing anything suspicious. One person real-
ized they had been tricked when they were redirected to
the real site but this was after entering personal informa-
tion. In the fourth task when the spoofed website stated
CardSpace was “down for maintenance”, the same 11
participants fell for the spoof. The participant who real-
ized they were spoofed previously recognized the spoof
without entering any information. After reading the in-
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structional email, two people reported they were still
confused when completing the task that followed on the
real site. By the fourth task, the second task on a real
website, no one commented they were confused.
After reading the instructional email, 3 of the 13 par-
ticipants did not fall for the spoof that occurred imme-
diately after (a request to register for a new card). One
participant was previously an identity theft victim and
the other two participants cited the instructional email as
their reason for not completing the task. The final spoof
stated CardSpace was down for maintenance, and 3 peo-
ple were not tricked by it. The identity theft victim was
not tricked and one person cited the instructions. How-
ever, one person who cited the instructions in the pre-
vious spoof fell for the second spoof. The other person
remarked the site didn’t look right in general, so they
refused to complete the task. In the post-study ques-
tionnaire, four people said the CardSpace login proce-
dure required slightly too much time and six reported the
amount of time required by CardSpace was just right.
Overall, the participants were mostly confused that
CardSpace took the place of a username and password.
The spoof that stated CardSpace was down for mainte-
nance tricked 11 of the 13 participants and after the in-
structional email the same spoof tricked 10 of the 13.
The spoof that asked the participant to register for an-
other card was successful on 11 of the 13 participants
and after the instructional email successfully tricked 10
of the 13.
3.2 Verisign Secure Letterhead
Secure letterhead assists the user by displaying security
context information interactively and more prominently
in the web browser’s primary interface. The implemen-
tation we tested was Firefox extension and displayed the
logotype and certificate authority fields from an extended
validation X.509 certificate [8, 9]. When the user navi-
gates to a website that has an extended validation certifi-
cate, the logotype is displayed in the upper right hand
corner of the browser next to the location bar. It extracts
relevant fields from the SSL certificate, which can be dif-
ficult for users to find and understand. The fields are dis-
played as an interactive visual indicator. More certificate
information is shown when user clicks on the logotype.
3.2.1 Data Collected
We conducted five sessions with Secure Letterhead, two
female and three male. Their ages ranged from 18-50
and all reported to spend 20 or more hours on the Inter-
net per week. Only one of the users demonstrated prior
knowledge of phishing.
The four tasks prior to the instructional email that de-
tailed how to use Secure Letterhead directed the user to
a real site, a fake site where no additional information
was displayed, a real site, and a fake site spoofing Se-
cure Letterhead with CSS and HTML. The four remain-
ing task emails were in the same order except the first of
the second set was also the instructional email.
Since Secure Letterhead does not alter the login pro-
cess, the first task went smoothly for the participants,
however, no one noticed the presence of the logotype
or tried to click on it. The first spoof, where no addi-
tional information was presented, tricked all 5 partici-
pants. One participant realized they had been tricked and
wasn’t tricked again during the study. However, Secure
Letterhead did not play a role in their realization; instead
they realized they were tricked after logging in and being
forwarded to the real login page. Again, the task on the
real website went smoothly, but no one noticed the logo-
type. The second spoof, where the interface was recre-
ated using CSS and HTML, was successful in tricking 4
of the 5 participants.
Every participant attempted to access the information
in the logotype after reading the instructional email. One
commented the instructions were incorrect and the logo
was on the left, indicating they clearly misunderstood
which logo the instructions referred to and mistook an
image in the webpage content for the logotype. Another
did not to complete the task and wrote they didn’t have
a reason to trust the information it displayed. Another
commented the instructions were too wordy, then during
the task attempted to access the information by clicking
on the logo in the page content. This behavior suggests
users are unable to distinguish between page content and
trusted indicators, which was also observed by Whalen
et al. [15] and Dhamija et al. [6].
The first spoof after the instructional email, where no
additional information was displayed, tricked 4 of the
5 participants. In the remaining three tasks, only two
attempted to access the information. One of them at-
tempted to access the information after being redirected
to the real site because they had already entered their cre-
dentials on the illegitimate site. In other words, they
checked the credentials at the wrong point of interac-
tion and had already lost their password. The other one
checked the logotype on the real website. The final spoof
with the recreation of Secure Letterhead in content suc-
cessfully tricked 4 of the 5 participants.
In the post-study questionnaire, 3 of the 5 participants
reported they would remember to check for the logotype
if they were about to do something important. 2 of the 5
participants stated they would not have figured out how
to use Secure Letterhead without instructions. One per-
son commented the information displayed did not seem
useful, and two commented the information might be
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useful but may not be necessary.
Overall, it appeared as though the participants were
unsure of how to interpret the information presented by
Secure Letterhead, why it was important, or why they
should trust it. These comments were made in the post-
task questionnaire after receiving the instructional email
and in the post-study questionnaire.
4 Conclusions
This paper presents RUST, a testbed for evaluating the
usability of website authentication technologies. The re-
sults we present demonstrate the versatility of RUST, its
ability to test different types of technologies, and the
detailed feedback it collects about why participants are
tricked, which would not be possible in an in-the-wild
study. Though RUST is not intended to measure how
users’ performance is affected by time, minor changes
can be made to account for this new goal. As an addi-
tional benefit, RUST can be used to compare technolo-
gies since they same usability study design can easily be
used to evaluate different technologies.
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A Windows Cardspace
Figure 1: The user interface for selecting an identity
card.
B Verisign Secure Letterhead
Figure 2: The Extended Validation certificate fields dis-
played by the Firefox extension when the logotype is
moused over.
C Verisign Secure Letterhead Spoof
Figure 3: Verisign Secure Letterhead recreated in the
webpage content using CSS and HTML.
D User Study Material
This section provides the questionnaires from RUST’s
usability study.
D.1 Post-task Questionnaire
The participant is given a post-task questionnaire for
each task in the session. Each questionnaire has a set
of questions to answer if the participant completed the
task and a set of questions to answer if they chose not to
complete the task.
D.1.1 Questions for those who completed the task
If you decided to complete the task, please answer the
following questions:
1. Please mark the most accurate description of your
experience with this task:
• I knew what to do right away.
• After a moment I knew what to do.
• After a few minutes I knew what to do.
• I completed the task, but I’m not sure I did it
correctly.
• Something was unclear about the task and I
was unable to figure out what to do.
2. Additional comments: (eg: about the task, email,
website, an explanation of your previous answer)
D.1.2 Questions for those who did not complete the
task
If you decided NOT to complete the task, please answer
the following questions:
1. What contributed to your decision to not complete
the task?
2. Additional comments: (eg: about the task, email,
website, an explanation of your previous answer)
D.2 Post-study Questionnaire
1. When a site asks you for sensitive personal infor-
mation (eg: account information, passwords, social
security number), which of the following do you
check to ensure you’re giving your information to
a valid website? ( When you think you’re on your
bank’s website, how do you know that you aren’t on
another site?)
Check all the apply:
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• Look for the lock icon
• Check the url in the address bar
• Check the certificate of the page
• Look at the information on the page (the im-
ages, the text, or the brand name)
• Look for the security or privacy policy
• Wait for personalized image or text to be dis-
played (not available on all websites)
• Other, please specify.
2. What do you typically do when you receive an email
that provides you with a link and asks you to go
to the website and sign into your account, to either
update your account or verify a transaction?
Check all the apply:
• Click on the link to follow the instructions
• Type the url into the address bar to follow the
instructions
• Go to the site using a bookmark to follow the
instructions
• Delete the email
• I don’t receive emails like this
• Other, please specify
The goal of the technology evaluated in this study is to
give the user a better way of knowing they are on the cor-
rect site. During the study you should have also received
an email with instructions on how to correctly use Name
of technology.
Technology : Brief description of technology and how
it should work, similar to the instructional email.
Please refer back to the above description as needed
for the remaining questions. If anything is unclear, please
ask questions.
1. Prior to reading the instructional email:
• Was it noticeable that the technology was in
place? If so, what was noticeable?
• Did the technology make it clear how it should
be used? If so, please describe.
2. Imagine you were required to use technology each
time you signed in to a financial institution’s web-
site. Choose one of the following to describe your
feeling about the amount of time it requires:
• Not enough
• Slightly too little
• The perfect amount
• Slightly too much, but reasonable
• Way too much
• Comments:
3. Choose one of the following to describe how often
you would remember to follow the process closely:
• Never
• When I was about to do something important
• Most of the time
• Every time
• Comments:
4. Choose one of the following to describe your overall
impression of technology:
• The information it provides is useful, and it
seems necessary.
• The information it provides appears useful,
but I’m not sure it’s necessary
• The information it provides does not appear
useful.
• The information it provides is not useful to me
at all.
• Other, please explain.
• Comments
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